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THE FUNCTION OF "DYSFUNCTIONAL" BOARDS
Franklin A. Gevurtz*

l. INTRODUCTION

For many years , there was a scholar-in-residence on the Pacific
McGeorge faculty named Abbott Goldberg. Abbot told me about a
classmate of his at Harvard Law School, Louis Henkin, who ultimately
became a University Professor (with the right to teach in any
department) at Columbia University. Recognizing Henkin's utter
brilliance , even as first year law student, Abbott asked Henkin what his
approach was to studying law. Henkin answered that he outlined the
substance of his courses. When Abbott seemed unimpressed, Henkin
continued, "And then I outline the outlines." After Abbott asked what
the next step was, Henkin explained, "And then I outline the outline of
the outlines. " Abbott then said, "Don ' t tell me, you then outline the
outline of the outline of the outlines?" to which Henkin replied, "Now
you got it". Henkin then explained that his goal was to continue this
process until he reduced the entire first year of law school to one word.
Intrigued , Abbott asked if Henkin had succeeded , and, after receiving an
affirmative response , Abbott asked for the word. Playing coy, Henkin
replied , "What, does Macy's tell Gimbels its secrets for selling clothes?"
Nevertheless, Henkin relented. First, however, Henkin asked Abbott if
Abbott knew Yiddish, to which Abbott pointed out that Abbott's last
name was Goldberg . According to Henkin , the one word that
summari zed the entire first year of law school is a Yiddish word; this
word is "nu" , which roughly translates as "so."
Abbott passed away a few years ago and I have been looking for an
occasion to remember him by telling this story. This Symposium finally
provid ed the opportunity, because this one Yiddish word , "nu ,"
summarize s the thesis of my paper. When asked about my reaction to
the boardroom "scandal" at Hewlett-Packard, as I was by a couple of
report ers at that time, I confess that what I really wanted to say was "nu"
or, in English , "so. " In this paper, I will explain why.
One usage of the expression nu is to convey a lack of surprise at a
fact; or, perhap s more precisel y, some disappointment that the person to
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whom the comment is directed is surprised by a fact. Accordingly , the
first part of this paper examines whether complaints about dysfunctional
boards of directors are really anything new. In fact, such complaints
seem to be as old and as widespread as the institution of corporate
boards themselves.
The more profound usage of the expression nu and the usage that
Henkin realized underlay all of legal education is to communicate the
need, in every situation , to reexamine fundamental premises. In the
context of this Symposium, we cannot examine the causes or cures of
board dysfunction unless and until we agree on what is dysfunctional;
and we cannot agree on what is dysfunctional until we agree on what the
board's function is . It turns out , however, that it is by no means clear
just what the board's real function is supposed to be, and therefore it is
not clear when we should consider a board to be dysfunctional. This is
the subject of the second part of this paper.
II. THEUNIVERSALITY
OFNON-FUNCTIONAL
BOARDS:ORSOWHATELSE
Is "Nu"
Prompted by the corporate scandals of 2001 and 2002, with the
examples of somnolent directors at Enron and Worldcom , there was a
great gnashing of teeth and wailing of complaints about what had gone
wrong with corporate boards. 1 This led me to ask how the basic model
of corporate governance throughout the world, 2 came to call for
management under a board of directors 3 elected (normally) by the
shareholders. 4 As I researched the historical origins of the corporate

1. E.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern
Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1233, 1241-42 (2002) (Enron's
board was "a splendid board on paper," and its failure "reveal(s) a certain weakness with the board as a
governance mechanism."); The Way We Govern Now- Corporate Boards, ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 2003, at
59 (discussion of poor board governance in light of corporate scandals involving Enron); Joseph Fuller
& Michael C. Jensen, What's A Director To Do? (Harvard Negotiation, Organization and Markets
Resea rch, Paper No. 02-38, 2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=357722 ("The recent
wave of corporate scandals provides continuing evidence that boards have failed to fulfill their role as
the top-level corporate control mechanism").
2. See, e.g., RICHARD M. BUXBAUM& KLAUSJ. HOPT, LEGALHA_RMONIZATION
ANDTHE
BUSINESSENTERPRISE:
CORPORATEANDCAPITALMARKETLAW HARMONIZAT
ION POLICYIN EUROPE
ANDTHEU.S.A. 182-84 (I 988)(discussing the prevailing use of corporate boards in Europe); Howard
Gensler, Company Formation and Securities Listing in the People's Republic of China, 17 Hous. J. Int' !
L. 399, 420-2 1 (1995) (discussing the requirement for a corporate board in China); Christopher Lee
Heftel, Corporate Govemance in Japan : The Position of Shareholde rs in Publicly Held Corporations, 5
U. HAW. L. REV. 135, 138-40, 153- 54 ( 1983) (discussing the requirement for a corporate board in
Japan).
3. E.g., MODELBus. CORP.ACT§ 8.01; DEL. CODEANN.tit. 8, § 141(a) (2008).
4. E.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.03(c); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211 (b) (2008). The
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board, 5 and how this mode of corporate governance spread throughout
the world, 6 it soon became clear that wherever and whenever corporate
board have existed, boards have provoked complaints about their failure
to function properly.
I should not have been surprised to find that the history of corporate
boards is marked by the evident failure of the institution to function as
envisioned. Not long before I entered the field of corporate law,
scholars, such as my former teacher, Melvin Eisenberg,7 argued that the
limited time available to outside directors; management's control over
the agenda and information received by the board; biases introduced by
various relationships between directors and management; and
management's control over the process of director selection, combined
to undermine the effectiveness of corporate boards either as a decision
making institution or as an institution that monitors management.
Studies by Robert Gordon in the l 960s 8 and Miles Mace in the l 970s 9
provided empirical support for the conclusion that boards were largely
passive pawns of management, and had no real role in running the
corporation. 10
There is nothing in either the Gordon or the Mace studies to suggest
that director passivity was a recent phenomenon in the 1960s or 1970s.
In 1934, William Douglas wrote a classic article complaining about
directors who did not direct. 11 Furthermore, such complaints are not
limited to boards in the United States; similar complaints are heard
about boards in Japan, 12 Germany, 13 and France 14~hardly undeveloped
primary exception to the shareholder election of directors is the Gem1an invented system of codetermination, under which employees elect up to half of the corporation's directors. See, e.g.,
FRANKLIN
A. GEVURTZ,GLOBALISSUESINCORPORATE
LAW63-64 (2006).
5. Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of
Directors, 33 HOFSTRAL. REV. 89 (2004).
6. Franklin A. Gevurtz, The European Origins and Spread of the Co1porate Board of Directors,
33 STETSON
L. REV. 925 (2004).
THE STRUCTURE
OFCORPORATE
LAW 149- 85 (1977).
7. E.g., MELVINA. EISENBERG,
8. ROBERTAARONGORDON,BUSINESSLEADERSHIP
IN THELARGECORPORATION
143 (1966)
(the board of directors in the typical large corporation does not actively exercise an important part in the
leadership function).
9. See MYLESL. MACE, DIRECTORS:MYTHSAND REALITY 107 (1971) (study finding that
directors rarely challenged or monitored CEO performance, but instead often served as little more than
"attractive ornaments on the corporate Christmas tree"); Myles L. Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality-Ten Years Later, 32 RUT. L. REV. 293 ( 1979) (study reaffirmed results of earlier study as to director
passivity).
I 0. This discussion focuses on the board in the widely held, rather than the closely held,
corporation. In the case of a closely held corporation, the board commonly consists of the major
shareholders, who often run the firm much as partners. See F. HODGE O'NEAL & ROBERT B.
THOMPSON,O'NEAL ANDTHOMPSON'S
CLOSECORPORATIONS
ANDLLCs § 1.07 (3d ed. 2004).
11. William 0. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1305 (1934).
ANDCORPORATE
GOVERNANCE:
TRENDSIN
12. E.g., Oxford Analytica Ltd., BOARDDIRECTORS
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nations that one would assume have weak institutions of corporate
governance. Such dissatisfaction with corporate boards and directors is
not a twentieth century phenomenon. In the nineteenth century the
notion of directors being blindly oblivious to stock swindles had
sufficiently pervaded the public consciousness to form part of a classic
work of English literature. 15 Likewise, at around the same time, half a
world away, one could read criticisms in Japanese economic journals
about inaction by directors of Japanese companies. 16
Of course, the fact that large corporations have prospered, and have
contributed to modern economic prosperity, suggests that there must be
something right about the management structure of corporations notwithstanding complaints arising from periodic corporate meltdowns.
Still, it is difficult to read the work of economic historians without
concluding that the managerial developments that made corporations
work are those- like the development of the U-form and M-form
organizational structure-that occurred below the level of the board of
directors. 17
G7 COUNTRIESOVER THE NEXT TEN YEARS (1992), reprinted in ROBERTA. G. MONKS & NELL
MINNOW,CORPORATEGOVERNANCE267 (2d ed. 2001) (stating that in Japan formal authority is held by
the company president and the board of directors , but board meetings are infrequent and decisions are
rubber stam ped; real authority is held by the president and the operating committee composed of the
president's immediate subo rdinates).
13. E.g., Mark J. Roe , Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Control, 53 STAN.
L. REV. 539, 568 (2000) (Gemrnn corporate supervisory boards meet infrequently and their information
has been weak).
14. E.g., MONKS & MINNOW, supra note 12, at 292 (the president director-general (PDG) of
French companies wields almost unchecked contro l over the enterprise without the counter power of the
board, whose composition and agenda the PDG controls; indeed, it is regarded as bad manner s for the
board to vote on a management decision).
15. E.g., ANTHONYTROLLOPE, THE WAY WE LIVE Now 298-309 (1875). "Melmotte [the chief
executive officer of the company, and perpetrator of a fraudulent promotion ,] would speak a few slow
words ... always indicative of triumph, and then everybody would agre e to everything, somebody
would sign something, and the 'Boa rd ' ... would be over." Id. at 138.
16. Tsunehiko Yui, The Development of the Organizational Structure of Top Managemenl in
Meiji Japan, in 1 JAPANESEY.B. ON BUS. HtSTORY I , 7 (1984) . (referring to Ukichi Taguchi, the
publisher of the Tokyo Keizai Zasshi, then Japan's most influential economic journal, who wrote in
1884, "directors [of Japanese banks] might as well be retired .. . . [T]he president handles everything
himself.").
17. See RICHARDS. TEDLOW,THE RISE OF THE AMERICANBUSINESSCORPORATION13-24 , 5660 (1991 ). While the universal adoption of board governance for public corporations mak es it difficult to
perform an emp irica l study on the impact of proceeding without a board, various recent studies attempt
to assess the impact of board composition and other corporate governance practices on corpo rate
performance . Much of the results have been inconc lusive. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The
Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance , 54 Bus. LAw. 921 ( 1999)
(reviewing over I 00 studies and finding no convin c ing evidence that independent direcJors improve firm
performance); Robert W. Hamilton , Co,porate Governance in America 1950-2 000: Major Changes bu/
Uncertain Benefits, 25 J. CORP. L. 349, 359- 73 ( 1999) (studies have not produced consistent positive
results from changes in corporate governance , suc h as increased use of independent directors). Studies in
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III. THE FUNCTION OF CORPORATE BOARDS: OR, "Nu," WH AT Do You
THINK THE BOARD Is SUPPOS ED TO Do?

Interestingly, one reporter who contacted me after the HewlettPackard scandal broke did so because he read my article on the history
of the board of directors. He was the editor-at-large for Fortune
Magazine, and he explained that he and other reporter s working on the
Hewlett-Packard story had gotten into a conversation about why
corporations have boards of directors. These reporters had hit upon a
critical insight: One cannot assess the significanc e of the so-called
scandal at Hewlett-Packard without understanding the role of the board ,
and one cannot understand the role of the board without understanding
the board's history. 18

A. Ostensible Functions
The earliest general corporation laws called upon the board to manage
the corporation. 19 Recognizing that boards can hardly conduct day-today management of any business ,20 modem corporate statutes call for
management of the corporation "by or under the direc tion of' the
board. 21 Traditionally, it is said that the board sets corporate polic y,
makes the major decisions, and delegates to management the task of
carrying out policy and those decisions. 22 The Gordon and Mace studies
demonstrated that this "tradition" is a myth: Management sets polic y and
even makes major decisions, the role of the board is reduced to
less develop ed economies suggest perhap s a greater impac t. Mark Mobius , Issues in Global Co,porate
Governance, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:AN A SIA-PACIFIC CRITIQUE47-48 (Low Chee Kcong ed.,
2002) (recent studies in emerging markets show be tter stock performance of companies with so-ca lled
better corporate governa nce , including more independe nt boards) . Nevert he less, it is difficult to say how
mu ch of this result co mes from having a board versus from hav ing other so-ca lled good corporate
governance pra ctices; how much improv ed mark et returns retlect d current desire by inves tors for stoc k
of co mpan ies with so-called better corporate gove rnance practices , and how much retlects actual
impro ved performance by such corporations.
18. For the outgrowth of thi s conversation , see Posting of Justin Fox to The Curious Cap ita list,
Who Needs a Board of Directors Anyway ?, http: //curiouscapitalist.blog s.time .com /2006 /09 /20/who_nee
ds_ a_board_of_dire ctor s/ (Sept. 20, 2006 , 11 :40 EST). See also James Surow ieck, Zip It, NEW YORKER
3 1 (Oct. 9, 2006) , availab le al http ://www.newyor ke r.co m/arch ive/2006/l 0/09/ 061009ta_ talk_surowie
ck i (citin g Gevurtz, supra note 5, for the proposition tha t there have always bee n complaints about
corporate boards); Posting of Justin Fox to The C urious Capi talist, Is Corporale Governance Really
Broken, http ://cu riousca pitalist.blogs.tirn e .com/2006 /09/26/is_ corporate _gove rnance_ really / (Sept. 28,
2006, 11:34 EST) (replying to Stephen Bainbrid ge's crit icism of the essay "Who Needs a Board of
Directors Anyway'').
19. 18 11 N.Y. Sess . Laws ch. LXVII (McKin ney) .
20. E.g., MODELBus. CORP. ACT§ 8.0l(b) crnt (2005) .
2 1. E.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT§ 8.0l(b) (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 14l(a) (2008) .
22. E.g., FRANKLINA. GEVURTZ,CORPORATION LAW§ 3. l.5a, at 229 - 30 (2000).
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providing formal approval (almost never disapproval) of those policies
and decisions. 23
The fact that corporate boards do not actually manage the corporation,
or make business decisions , has led many to ask what then is the
function of the board. Borrowing, consciously or unconsciously , from
the German supervisory board ,24 the view that arose in the 1970s was
that the primary function of the board was to monitor corporate
management. 25 This view of the board observes that in the publicly held
corporation there are too many scattered shareholders for the
shareholders themselves to efficiently monitor whether senior corporate
managers are running the company honestly and competently on the
shareholder's behalf. This, in tum, suggests that the purpose for having a
corporate board elected by the shareholders is to perform such
monitoring on shareholders' behalf. 26 Yet, to say that the board's
function is to monitor management does not say precisely what the
board is supposed to do. If all the board does is to observe , then what
does this accomplish? Borrowing from the German model , perhaps the
key action accompanying the monitoring model is the hiring and firing
of senior management , particularly the chief executive officer. 27
The monitoring model seems to provide an elegant rationale for a
shareholder-elected board. Yet, the model rests upon a rather curious
assumption, specifically, that shareholders, who are too numerous and
disengaged to monitor management on their own behalf, will become
sufficiently engaged and organized to select vigilant directors to perform
the monitoring. As ha s been recognized since the famous work by Berle
and Means, 28 · however, the reality is that management, and not
shareholders, generally selects the directors. 29 Needless to say,
management has limited incentives to select directors who will
aggressively monitor management. The predictable result has been that
boards traditionally have been only slightly more active in monitoring
23. See supra notes 8 9. See also Bayles s Manning, The Business Judgmen/ Rule and !he
Direclor 's Duly of A11enlion: TimeflJr Reality, 39 BUS. LAW. 1477, 1483 84 ( 1984).
24. See. e.g., GEVURTZ,supra note 4, at 67 69.
25. See PRINClrLES OF CORPORATEGOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RLCOMMENDAl'IONS § 3.02
( 1994); EISENBERG,supra note 7, nt 169- 70.
26. E.g., Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen,

Separa1iu1111/0w11er.1hip
and Co111rol,
26 J.L. &

ECON. 30 l, 3 II ( 1983).
27. See, e.g., GllVURTZ, .l'llprunote 4, at 67 (discussing rights of the German supervisory board);
GEVURTZ, supra note 22. § 3. l .5h(2), at 233 (suggesting that corporate boards might do better to focus
their attention on hiring and firing the CEO).
28. ADOLPII A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, TllE MODERN CORPORATIONAND PRIVATE
PROPERTY( 1932).
29. E.g., James D. Westphal & Edward J. Zajac, Who Shall Govern? CEO/Board Power.
Demographic Similarity, and New Director Selection, 40 ADMIN . SCI. Q. 60, 78 ( 1995).
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than they have been in managing. 30 Optimists may respond by pointing
to high profile sackings of CEOs in recent years, 31 suggesting that
boards are finally taking their monitoring role seriously- at least after a
CEO has been given plenty of time to wreak corporate havoc. Whether
or not this turns out to be a true renaissance for the corporate board, this
illustrates at least one unquestioned residual function of corporate
boards. Like the College of Cardinals selects the successor Pope, the
board selects the successor CEO.
Occasionally, another function has been claimed for the corporate
board: to mediate among shareholders and other corporate constituencies
such as managers, other employees, creditors, and perhaps even the
community at large. While strains of this notion go back, at least in the
United States, to the famous Berle-Dobbs debate in ~he Harvard Law
Review, 32 a recent article by Lynn Stout 33 attempts to find empirical
evidence that shareholders grant power to the board for this reason.
Specifically, Professor Stout argues that shareholder acquiescence in
devices, such as poison pills, that insulate boards from shareholder
30. E.g., MONKS& MINNOW,supra note 12, at 209 ("The primary conclusion of this chapter is
that America's boards of directors have, more often than not, failed to protect shareholders' interests.");
Rita Komik, Greenmail: A Study of Board Performance in Corporate Governance, 32 ADMIN.SCI. Q.
163, 166-67 (1987) (modem board is a "co-opted appendage institution").
31. See. e.g., Ted Evanoff, Struggling Ford Ousts Nasser, Installs Auto Heir as Its New CEO,
INDIANAPOLIS
STAR,Oct. 31, 200 I, at Cl (Ford board ousted CEO Jacques Nasser because of financial
losses); Laura Goldberg, Reliant Resources Chief Joins Exodus, Hous. CHRON.,Apr. 14, 2003, at Al
(CEO Steve Letbetter forced to resign as Reliant Resources board agreed it was "time for a change in
leadership"); Francine Knowles, Adulte,y Crashes Boeing's CEO: Board Ousts Him After Learning of
an Affair with Female Exec, CHI. SUN-TIMES,Mar. 8, 2005, at A3 (Boeing CEO Harry Stonecipher
forced to resign under board pressure); Bruce Meyerson, Gelling Rid of Bad CEO a Good Idea: Nortel
Networks Put Investors First by Holding f-lim Responsible/or Losses, PHILADELPHIA
INQUIRER,
May 2,
2004, at E3 (Nortel board fired CEO Frank Dunn because of "accounting turmoil"); Gary Rivlin,
Hewie/l's Board Forces Chief Out After Rocky Stay, N.Y. TIMES
, Feb. 10, 2005, at Al (Hewlett-Packard
board forced CEO Carly Fiorina, "one of the nation's best-known business executives and perhaps the
most powerful woman in corporate America," to resign following disagreements on corporate strategy).
Interestingly, however, this is not the first time news accounts of sacked CEOs have proclaimed the rise
of activist boards. See. e.g., Joann S. Lublin, Corporate Chie.f.1·Polish Their Relations with Directors,
WALLST. J., Oct. 15. 1993, at BI (CEOs arc "significantly revamping their dealings with directors"
because of recent actions taken by "activist boards"); Joann S. Lublin, More Chief Exec11tive.1·
are Being
Forced Out by Tougher 8oard.1~ Asserlive Outside Directors and a Difficult Economy Lead to Painful
/Jecisions - 811t It's Sli/1 a Slow Process, WALLST. J., June 6, 1991, at Al (Growing list of CEO
departures demonstrates the "rising vigilance of outside directors" nnd "portcnd[s] a power shift in the
American board room by creating of cadre of activist directors closely aligned with major
shareholders."). Yet, such earlier spurts of active boards were soon followed by years of silence from the
boardroom.
32. See A. A. Berle, Jr., For Whom CmyJorate Managers Are Tru.\"tees:A Nore, 45 HARV.L.
REV. 1365 (1932); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Co17JoraleManagers Trustees?, 45 HARV.L.
REV.1145(1932).
33. Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder As Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors in
Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance , 152 U. PA. L. REV.667 (2003).
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control 1s evidence that shareholders themselves have concluded that
boards exist for thi s purpose.
The question of whether directors should have either a duty or a right
to look out for the interests of stakeholders in the corporate enterprise
other than the shareholders (except insofar as doing so advances the
interests of the shareholders) has been a subject of considerable legal
and economic policy debate. 34 For present purposes , however, it is
sufficient to ask whether the composition of the board makes the board
any more likely to perform this role than that of managing the
corporation or monitoring corporate management. It would if boards
were composed of representatives of the various constituents , as, for
example, under the German system of co-determination. 35 Yet, it is
difficult to imagine a board selected entirely by one constituency whether it is the shareholders by virtue of their right to elect directors, or
the management by virtue of its practical control over the proxy
machinery-serving as the honest broker in mediating disputes between
all corporate stakeholders.
All told, the corporate board seems to be an institution in search of a
purpose. The nature of its selection and composition seems to preclude
its effective functioning in a managing, monitoring, or mediating role.

B. What the Historica l Origins of the Board Tells Us About the Purposes
and Functions of the Corporate Board
Instead of trying to construct a positivist rationalization for what we
observe boards doing, or theorizing about what boards should be doing,
it might be more productive to ask how and why an elected board of
directors came to be the accepted mode of corporate governance. In fact,
the original purpose for having corporate boards was quite different
from the purposes discussed above. This insight , in tum , may help
explain the frustrating dissonance between what corporate law expects
of boards, and what boards actually do.
While the Bank of England pioneered the term "directo r," 36 and

34. See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919): Credit Lyonnais Bank
Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., Civ. A. No. 12150 , 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec.
30, 1991 ); Comm. on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potenrial/or Confusion, 45 Bus.
LAW. 2253 (1990); Morey W. McDaniel, Stockholders and Stakeholders, 21 STETSONL. REV. 121
(1991).
35. See supra note 4.

OF MODERN COMPANY
36. E.g., RONALDRALPH FORMOY,THE HISTORICALFOUNDATIONS
LAW21 ( 1923) . While the 1618 charter of the Africa Company called for a board of twelve "di rectors,"
this terminology for board members did not catch on until the 1694 charter of the Bank of England. See
I WILLIAMR. SCOTT,THE CONSTITUTION
AND FINANCEOF ENGLISH,SCOTTISHAND )RISHJOINT-
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seemingly influenced American acceptance of corporate board
govemance, 37 it is the English trading companies that occup y center
stage in the story of the corporate board. The charters of the famous
sixteenth and seventeenth century English trading companies (the East
India Company , the Russia Company, the Eastland Company, the
Levant Company, the Hudson's Bay Company, and the South Sea
Company) demonstrate the consistent use of governing boards. 38 This
show s that the use of corporate governing boards date s back almost half
a millennium. More significantly, these trading companies played a
critical role in establishing the use of boards as the governing
mechanism for the business corporation . Interestingly , this development
did not involve the boards of these companies; it involved what was
going on around the boards. These companies were undergoing a
metamorphosis from so-called regulated companies-e ssentially guilds
whose membership consisted of merchants conducting independent
operations under the company 's franchise - into joint stock companies,
in which voting power and economic return came from investing in a
common enterprise. While this evolution did not alter the structure of the
governing board , it did fundamentally change what the board was
supposed to do. The board transformed from a regulatory body , which
preserved an exclusive franchise on behalf of a group of merchants who
conducted individual businesses , into a supervisory body, which had
overall responsibility for running a business.
The Eastland Company provides a good example of a regulated
company. The Eastland Company ' s charter granted the merchants in the
company the exclusive right among English subjects to trade with
Scandinavia and the Baltic region. 39 As a regulated company , the
Eastland Company did not conduct operations as a corporation. Instead ,
the merchants who were the members of the company conducted trading
operations , either individually or in ad hoc partnerships. 40 This fact lead s
to a critical question from the standpoint of the history of board
governance: If a regulated company did not conduct operations as a
corporation, what was the purpo se of having a governing board? The
answer is that the board adopted ordinances to govern the activities of

STOCK COMPANIES TO 1720, at 15 1- 52, 205 ( 1912).

E.g., Gcvurt z, supra note 5, at I I 0.
38. For a tabular li sting of the gove rnan ce stru ctures of Engli sh joint stock co mpanie s until 1720,
showing predominately board governance, sec 3 WILLIAM R. SCOTT, T HE CONSTITUTION AND FINANCE
OF ENGLISH, SCOTTISii AND )RISH JOINT-STOCK COM PANI ESTO 1720, at 462- 80 ( 19 12).
39. E.g., G EORGE CA WSON& A.H. K EANE, THE EARLY CHARTERED COMPANIES 6 1 ( 1896) .
40. E.g., THO MAS STUART WILLA N, THE EARLY HI STORY OF T HE RUSSIA COMPANY: 15531603, at 19- 20 ( 1959).
37.
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the members of the company. 41 For example, the board of the Eastland
Company adopted a prohibition on "colouring" goods. 42 Colouring
referred to selling goods of a non-member merchant as a member's
own .43 By operating in this fashion as undisclosed principals, nonmembers attempted to circumvent the company's exclusive franchise.
As this example illustrates, the role of a regulated company's board was
not to exercise overall responsibility for operating a business, but rather
to impose rules on individual merchants in order to preserve a
monopoly.
The Russia Company may have been the first joint stock company. 44
In the joint stock company, instead of each merchant trading in his own
stock (merchandise), the merchants subscribed to a fund that financed a
combined or joint stock of merchandise for trading by agents of the
company-hence, the title "joint stock company" from which the current
label of stockholder is derived. 45 The development of the joint stock
company, by setting the stage for transferable ownership interests in
which voting power can depend upon the number of interests purchased
and in which voting power might become widely dispersed among
passive investors, obviously had tremendous implications for corporate
governance; it laid the groundwork for the separation of ownership from
control. For purposes of this paper, however, dealing as we are with the
function of the corporate board, the development of the joint stock
company had another impact. The same board structure that existed to
enact and enforce rules governing the conduct of independent merchants
in the regulated company (such as the Eastland Company) found itself
pressed into service to manage a large business venture in the joint stock
company (such as the Russia and East India Companies). This occurred
without any evident consideration to the different nature of these tasks,
or to whether an institution developed for one task best fit the needs of
the other .46
The use of boards by the sixteenth and seventeenth century English
trading companies appears to derive from a pattern set by two of the
earliest companies of English merchants engaged in foreign trade: The
Company of the Merchants of the Staple and the Company of Merchant

41. Id. at 20.
42. See M. SchmitthotT, The Origin of the Joint Stock Company, 3 U. TORONTO.L.J. 74, 82
(1939).

43. Id.
44. E.g., SCOTT,supra note 36, at 17.
45. For a discussion of the meanings ascribed to the word "stock" in the early joint stock
companies, see SCOTT,supra note 36, at 158.
46. WILLAN,
supra note 40, at 19- 2 1.

"DYSFUNCTIONAL" BOARDS

2008]

401

Adventurers. As suggested by the charter of the Merchant Adventurers,
the boards of the Company of Merchant Adventurers and of the
Company of the Merchants of the Staple existed to pass ordinances
regulating the conduct of the members, as well as to resolve disputes
among the members. 47 Having traced the corporate board to these early
trading companies, the question becomes from where did these
companies get the idea for board governance?
Corporate governance by a representative board, working with a chief
executive officer (the "governor" in the typical parlance of the early
corporate charters), is a reflection of political practices and ideas
widespread in Western Europe in the late middle ages. Specifically,
while fictional literature often pictures medieval Europe as a place of
autocratic governance by kings, European political ideology and practice
in the late middle ages, although hardly democratic, often called for the
use of collective governance by a body of representatives. Examples of
such representative governance ideas and practices are found in the
assemblies or parliaments of medieval Eurofean kingdoms, 48 in town
councils, 49 in governing councils for guilds,5 and in the Church. 51 The
unifying theme behind medieval parliaments, town council s, guild
councils, councils of the Church, and the boards of the trading
companies, is that they provided the means to comply with the
"corporate law" rule that "what touches all shall be consented to by all"
in circumstances when consent by assembly of the entire group was
impractical. 52 Given this prevalent practice and the ideology that
underlay this practice, it was natural for the early corporations to use
board governance.
In sum then , corporate boards originally were not about running a
business, or monitoring those who run a business , they were about
providing political legitimacy through a representative body. Moreover,

47. E.g., Gevurtz, supra note 5, at 126.
48. See, e.g., MICHAEL A. R. GRAV ES, TH E PARLIAMENTS OF EARLY MODERN EUROPE 18
(2001); BRUCE L YON, STUDIES OF WEST EUROPEAN MEDIEVAL INSTITUTIONS 176 (1978); Thomas N .
Bisson, The Milita,y Origins <ifMedieval Representation, 7 1 AM. HI STORICAL REV. 1199 ( 1966).
49. See, e.g., JOHN H. MUNDY & PETER RmSNEOERG, THE MEDIEVAL TOWN 50 (1958); SUSAN
REYNOLDS, KIN GDOMS AND COMMUNITIES IN WESTERN EUROPE, 900-1300 , at 191 (2d ed. 1997);
FRITZ RORIG, THE MEDIEVAL TOWN 26 ( 1967).
50. See, e.g., LUJO BRENTANO, ON THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF GUILDS AND TIIE
26 BULL.
ORIGINS OF TRADE-UNIONS 62 (1870); Cyril O'Donnell, Origins of the Cmporate Exec:111ive,
Bus. HI ST. SOC'Y 55, 63 (1952).
51.

E.g.,

ANTONY BLA CK, COUNCIL AND COMMUNE: TIIE CONCILAR MOVEMENT AND TIIE

FIFTEENTH-CENTURY 9 (1979).

52. See, e.g., ANTONY BLACK, GUILDS AND CIVI L SOCIETY IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL THO UGHT
Medieval Canon law and

FROM THE TwELFTH CENTURY TO THE PRESENT 25 (1984); B rian Tierney,
WesternConstitutionalism,52 CATHOLIC HI STORICAL REV. 1 (1966).
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the functions of this representative body were more legislative, or even
judicial, 53 than they were executive.
IV. CONCLUDTNG THOUGHTS ON WHAT Is A DYSFUNCTIONAL BOARD: Nu
Once we rethink the function of the corporate board in terms of its
historic origins, the analysis of what is a dysfunctional board, and
whether the Hewlett-Packard board was dysfunctional, changes.
To the extent that the function of the board is simply to provide
institutional legitimacy by its very existence as an elected institution,
then as long as an elected board is in place, the board has served its
function. Under this analysis, the only board that is dysfunctional is a
board that carries over following a deadlocked election. Indeed,
corporate statutes that call for corporate dissolution in the event of
repeated failure by evenly divided shareholders to elect new directors 54
embody this view of the board's function.
Perhaps, however, this view is too minimalist. Hence, one might ask
when is an institution, whose principle purpose is to represent others,
dysfunctional? In the context of Hewlett-Packard, the board members
were at odds. Nevertheless, the same was true of the shareholders. If the
function of the board is to represent the shareholders, did the dissention
on the board render the board dysfunctional, or functional? True, the
tactics of the competing sides had surpassed efforts at rational
persuasion, as one side apparently engaged in leaking information to
reporters, while the other engaged in illegal efforts to plug the leaks.
Yet, except for the illegal pretenses, this seems to be ordinary to roughand-tumble politics. Indeed, one might even compliment the board on
being engaged.
Interestingly enough, this same issue of when a divided representative
body should be condemned as "dysfunctional" pervades much of our
current political discourse. Congress' approval rating hovers at record
low levels, as politicians, pundits, and ordinary citizens all complain
about the inability of Congress to get anything done. And yet, if
Congress, a board , or any elected body truly represents a closely divided
electorate, what is it supposed to do? In such cases, perhaps it is not the
53. Medieval European Parliaments, town councils , and guild councils-often
composed of a
number of members that was some multiple of twelve -c ommonly adjudicated disputes, thereby
providing the foundations of the jury system. See, e.g., REYNOLDS, supra note 49, at 23-3 4. The
reintroduction of Roman law in the twelfth century led to the increasing use of single presiding judges in
lieu of adjudication by collective groups, as had been characteristic of earlier medieval Europe.
Resistance to this trend occurred in the preservation of trial by jury in England, and in mercantile
matters , in which assemblie s or groups of merchants continued to t1y disputes. Id. at 5 1- 58.
54. E.g., MODEL Bus.CORP.ACT§ l4 .30(2)( iii) (2005).
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